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Disaggregative Policy Delphi 
Futures-oriented workshop 
A B S T R A C T   
Contemporary infrastructure networks require large investments especially due to aging. In-
vestment opportunities of network-of-networks are often obscured because current scenarios 
often concern single infrastructure networks. Major barriers to the construction and use of 
network-of-networks scenarios are institutional fragmentation and the disconnection of scenario- 
development phases. This paper aims to construct and enhance the use of network-of-networks 
scenarios through a participatory scenario process. We employed a hybrid-method approach 
comprising document analysis, Disaggregative Policy Delphi, and futures-oriented workshop for 
five large national infrastructure administrations in the Netherlands. This approach yielded 
twelve key infrastructure developments for which 28 infrastructure experts provided future es-
timates. We constructed seven scenarios through cluster analysis of experts’ quantitative esti-
mates, qualitative direct content analysis of the qualitative data, and a futures table. The 
scenarios are: Infraconomy; Techno-Pessimism; Safety; Technological; Missed Boat; Hyperloop; 
and Green. Our results stress the importance of collaboration: desired scenarios are improbable 
when infrastructure administrations maintain their current sectoral perspective, whereas an inter- 
sectoral perspective may generate more investment opportunities. However, these network-of- 
networks investment opportunities do not simply emerge from network-of-networks scenarios; 
reasons include administrators’ prevailing conception that sufficient optimization capacity re-
mains within their own networks, and that no common ground exists that helps to overcome 
institutional fragmentation.   
1. Introduction 
Infrastructure planners in many western countries are increasingly confronted with new challenges. On the one hand, these relate 
to aging infrastructures and to increased quantity and quality demands of infrastructures1 such as roads, railways, and sea- and airports 
* Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: robin.neef@rug.nl (R. Neef), s.verweij@rug.nl (S. Verweij), t.busscher@rug.nl (T. Busscher), jos.arts@rug.nl (J. Arts).   
1 More precisely, with infrastructure we broadly refer to “the physical network that channels a flux (…) through conduits (…) or a medium (…) 
with the purpose of supporting a human population” (Neuman, 2006, p. 6). In our study, infrastructure concerns the physical conduits, i.e., the 
nodes and links of the network, demarcated to utilities (e.g., gas and electricity), public works (also when they are not publicly administered, e.g., 
highways and bridges), and individual physical facilities (e.g., ports and airports) at a national scale (as opposed to component or asset scale). We 
focus on transport and energy distribution infrastructures. We do not refer to social infrastructure (e.g., parks, sport facilities, hospitals, etc.) and 
knowledge networks (e.g., schools, universities). 
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(EIB, 2015; Herder & Wijnia, 2012; Womack, 2008). On the other hand, these relate to increasing interdependencies between systems 
generally (Biggs et al., 2015; De Roo & Silva, 2010; Loorbach, 2010) and different infrastructure networks specifically that can cause 
malperformance and cascade from one infrastructure network to another (D’Agostino & Scala, 2014; Lee et al., 2007; Rinaldi et al., 
2001; Zimmerman, 2001). Because of the increasing demand for infrastructure services due to, inter alia, economic growth, and so-
cietal requirements such as sustainability and climate adaptation (Anand et al., 2018; Hansman et al., 2006; Schuckmann et al., 2012; 
Schwab et al., 2017), aging and interdependent infrastructures increasingly threaten the uninterrupted flows of services – such as 
energy provision, transportation of goods and persons, and even human life in the case of, e.g., fatal breakdowns, gas explosions, or 
floods (De Bruijne, 2006; Verbong & van der Vleuten, 2004). 
Considerable investments are needed to prevent infrastructure failures (EIB, 2015; OECD, 2017). These investments should address 
the long lifespan of infrastructures, because infrastructures are characterized by high sunk costs and therefore invoke path de-
pendencies and lock-in; once constructed, infrastructures are not easily abandoned and they become sources of inertia (De Bruijne, 
2006; Geels, 2004; Wegener & Fürst, 1999). Additionally, future developments and societal needs are characterized by uncertainty 
(Maier et al., 2016; Pot et al., 2018; Rauws, 2017; Rittel and Webber, 1973; Walker et al., 2013), and different developments and needs 
may require different infrastructures. Therefore, infrastructure planners should anticipate multiple possible futures (cf. Börjeson et al., 
2006) collectively, given network interdependency effects (cf. Rinaldi et al., 2001). 
Usually, however, infrastructure administrators only moderately collaborate in strategic infrastructure planning processes (Van der 
Duin & Ligtvoet, 2019a, 2019b). A major barrier for collaboration in infrastructure planning is institutional fragmentation due to 
sectoral optimization (Busscher et al., 2015; De Bruijne & Van Eeten, 2007; Heeres et al., 2016; Loorbach et al., 2010). Sectoral 
optimization results in sectoral isolation instead of sectoral integration (De Bruijne, 2006; Geels, 2004), making strategic infrastructure 
planning processes vulnerable to myopia (Pot et al., 2018). Fragmentation also applies to infrastructure administrators’ strategic 
policy and innovation agendas, which are largely determined by government and politics. In turn, “this means that major decisions 
may be made on a political spur, while more incremental or maintenance-related decisions require careful readjustment of increasingly 
rationalized budgets” (Van der Duin & Ligtvoet, 2019a, p. 72). Whilst sectoral isolation may decrease the perceived complexity of 
decision-making processes with the promise of increased efficiency (Teisman et al., 2009), it hampers the collective anticipation of 
multiple possible futures. Furthermore, institutional fragmentation may hamper strategic planning processes that address the in-
terdependencies between infrastructure networks, thence obscuring investment opportunities on a network-of-networks level. A 
network-of-networks is the combination of multiple networks, where the functionality of one infrastructure network may (positively or 
negatively) affect another network, through geographic co-location or functional interdependence of goods or information (Rinaldi 
et al., 2001). Importantly, an infrastructure network in a network-of-networks may malfunction – despite having no investment need of 
itself – because of disruptions and interconnections of (tightly) coupled networks with direct interconnections. For example, the 
disruption of an energy network may inhibit the operation of an airport, which may cause departure halls to overcrowd, for which the 
access to the airport may be restricted to prevent panic by closing parts of the highway and railroad networks connecting to the airport. 
Therefore, despite institutional fragmentation, infrastructure administrations involved in making investments in infrastructure net-
works should address both this network-of-networks level and multiple possible futures to explore investment opportunities and 
improve network functioning. 
In this paper, we address the challenges of anticipating multiple possible futures of network-of-networks. We argue that strategic 
infrastructure (investment) planning processes require insight in a set of possible futures – i.e., scenarios – that a network-of-networks 
is required to accommodate, and that those scenarios should be collectively enacted upon between infrastructure administrators (cf. 
Hertogh & Bakker, 2017; Moloney et al., 2017). Whereas recent scenario studies focused on single networks (e.g. Liimatainen et al., 
2014; Linz, 2012; Tapio et al., 2017), scenarios on a network-of-networks level are largely absent (Hall et al., 2013). Furthermore, this 
paper provides insight into how the phases of scenario construction and use can be bridged. This is pivotal because the disconnection of 
these scenario phases hampers effective anticipation (O’Brien & Meadows, 2013) and because little is known about how to effectively 
connect these phases, despite contemporary developments in participatory scenario studies (e.g. Heger and Rohrbeck, 2012; Nygrén, 
2019; van der Duin et al., 2014). 
The aim of this paper is to investigate possible future developments surrounding infrastructure networks by constructing scenarios 
for the network-of-networks, and to explore the use of those scenarios for the planning of individual infrastructure networks and the 
network-of-networks by infrastructure administrators. The research questions are: (1) what are possible scenarios on a network-of- 
networks level and (2) what are the consequences of the constructed scenarios for infrastructure planning? We focused our study 
on the Netherlands, because Dutch infrastructure planning is often characterized as institutionally fragmented, and because the 
country’s high spatial density of inhabitants and infrastructure networks gives rise to many interdependencies and possibly network- 
of-networks investment opportunities. 
2. Scenarios as products and processes 
Acknowledging the versatility of the concept of scenarios and the discussion about definitions and approaches in the literature 
(Bradfield et al., 2005; Spaniol & Rowland, 2018; Vecchiato & Roveda, 2010), scenarios can generally be defined as fundamentally 
different futures that are analytically coherent and internally consistent, encompassing concrete and plausible end states, their sur-
roundings, and the wider environments in a concrete and focused narrative (Bishop et al., 2007; Hirschhorn, 1980; Nowack et al., 
2011; Ramirez et al., 2008; Schoemaker, 1993; Wright & Goodwin, 2009). Scenarios are a purposeful basis for further inquiry of, and 
for imaginatively engaging with, the future: they intend to capture and bound the mental mode of decision-makers, highlight pre-
dictability and uncertainty, and reduce the risk of being surprised or unprepared. Scenarios thus aid in changing decision-makers’ 
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minds, without yet describing a course of action (Bishop et al., 2007; Bradfield et al., 2005; Chermack, 2017; O’Brien & Meadows, 
2013; Schoemaker, 1993; Van der Heijden, 2005). Moreover, scenarios are both products and (social) processes: the product focusses 
on the development of the scenario content; the process on organizational learning and consensus building (Hulme & Dessai, 2008; 
O’Neill et al., 2008). Both perspectives are required to enhance the quality of decision-making (Hulme and Dessai, 2008). 
Scenarios-as-products capture the mental modes and future images of decision-makers, i.e., the informally constructed, individually, 
and sometimes implicitly and inconsistently held knowledge, values, and beliefs – in particular envisioned futures – that consciously 
and subconsciously assist the holder in anticipating the future (Bell, 2003; Kaboli & Tapio, 2018; Polak, 1973; Rubin, 2013; Van Asselt 
et al., 2010). Transforming future images into clear and rich scenarios is crucial to inform decision-making, because when not done 
well, scenarios “are insufficiently precise and can mean many things to different people. No wonder that scenarios sometimes 
disappoint” (Van der Heijden, 2005, p. 18). Scenarios are not predictions, but depictions of possible futures (cf. Börjeson et al., 2006). 
Scenarios-as-products can help decision-makers “to improve the probability of desirable ones [futures], decrease the probability of the 
undesirable ones, and gear up to coping with the inconceivable sure to come” (Dror, 2006, p. 90). 
Scenarios-as-processes are valued mostly (or only) for the consequent decision-making and learning (Durance & Godet, 2010; Hulme 
& Dessai, 2008; O’Neill et al., 2008; Wilson, 2000) and are aimed at performative effects, varying from acquaintance (knowing 
possible futures) to consideration (having frames of reference for decision-making) and consent (actually being influenced by the 
scenarios) (van Doren et al., 2013). In order to have performative effects, the scenario construction and scenario use phases need to be 
bridged (Daheim & Uerz, 2008; Godet, 2000; O’Brien & Meadows, 2013; Schoemaker et al., 1998; Wright et al., 2013), especially in 
multi-organizational contexts (Wright et al., 2017, p. 2). Limited phase bridging may result in limited scenario implementation and 
appropriation, thence limiting learning success and reducing anticipatory and decision-making power (Lehr et al., 2017). 
To bridge scenario construction to scenario use, participation is important. Participating throughout the scenario process may 
enhance actors’ consideration of the plausibility of the scenarios. This, in turn, may incentivize these actors to employ the scenarios in 
strategy formulation or to compare their strategies to the scenarios, thus enhancing stress-testing capacity2 (Durance & Godet, 2010; 
Godet, 2000; Lehr et al., 2017; O’Brien & Meadows, 2013). Additionally, participation may contribute to broader variety of thought 
and unlock the capability of participants to engage in strategic decision-making processes instead of just their operational or tactical 
time-scale knowledge (Chermack & Nimon, 2008). Moreover, participation “can avoid the risk of being limited to existing mental 
models, becoming one-dimensional and narrow-sighted [sic] or being influenced by the power structures within the company” 
(Gattringer et al., 2017, p. 299). However, participation is not broadly adopted because it introduces social influences and biases such 
as groupthink, halo effects, status, and strong personalities (Hallowell, 2009; Landeta, 2006; Tersine & Riggs, 1976), thus negatively 
influencing the clearness and richness of the scenarios. In practice, construction-participants are therefore not necessarily 
use-participants, despite the potential to enhance scenario use by involving participants throughout the scenario process (Schwartz, 
1991). 
3. Materials and methods 
Table 1 summarizes our data collection and analysis, a hybrid of three methods: document analysis, Disaggregative Policy Delphi 
(DPD), and a futures-oriented workshop. This hybrid approach addresses biases the methods alone cannot. First, the document analysis 
enhances transparent and systematic selection of the actual scenario documentation (by expert-practitioners) and subsequent content 
(by the researcher) rather than having biases such as implicit presuppositions and personal expertise of the researchers guide this 
selection (Kulshrestha et al., 2018). Second, the Delphi’s anonymous and round-based structure limits social influences and biases such 
as groupthink, halo effects, status, and strong personalities (Hallowell, 2009; Landeta, 2006; Mullen, 2003; Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004; 
Tersine & Riggs, 1976) for scenario construction. Thirdly, the futures-oriented workshop connects scenario construction to scenario use 
Table 1 
Overview of Data Collection and Analysis.  
Round Method Data Analysis # Collected Time Period 
1 Document analysis (3.1.) Coded strategic foresight documents for critical forces to 
determine scenario content 
33 documents June 2018 – 
September 
2018 
2 Disaggregative Policy Delphi 
Survey 1: seminars (3.2.1;3.2.2) 
Employ Expertise matrix to maximize participant variety and 
expertise coverage 
36 surveys December 
2018 – 
April 2019 
3 Disaggregative Policy Delphi 
Interviews: 1− 1 (3.2.3; 3.2.5) 
Execute Qualitative Direct Content Analysis to construct 
scenario storylines 
34 interviews April 2019 – 
May 2019 
4 Disaggregative Policy Delphi 
Survey 2: seminars (3.2.2; 3.2.4) 
Run Multivariate Cluster Analysis of 45 variables in 11 
themes; 1 expert = 2 future estimates; employ Futures 
Table to construct scenarios 
28 surveys, minimum 4 per 
infrastructure administration 
May 2019 – 
June 2019 
5 Futures-oriented Workshop 
(3.2.6; 3.3) 
Assess probability, desirability, and sectoral orientation to 
analyze scenario use 
29 attendees, incl. six plus-one 
invitees 
October 2019  
2 “Stress-testing emphasizes optimizing simultaneously against a number of different futures which are all considered equally plausible decisions, 
instead of one scenario being more likely than another” (Van der Heijden, 2005, p. 4). 
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and enhances stress-test capacity (Chermack & Nimon, 2008; Godet, 2000; Street, 1997). Together, the combination of these methods 
enabled a participatory scenario process, where experts of the infrastructure administrations participated in all rounds, which 
incentivized scenario use; at the same time, the participation of the experts does not inhibit the reproducibility of the scenario con-
struction because the analysis was done by the researchers utilizing qualitative directed content analysis, cluster analysis, and a futures 
table. Finally, the sampling strategies of these combined methods intended to be representative of current infrastructure adminis-
trations in order to reveal futures images and futures estimates that prevail in contemporary infrastructure administrations. By doing 
so, the employed methods are equipped to strike the mental modes of decision-makers (Van Asselt et al., 2010), and they allow for 
comparing multiple possible futures from a departure point that is grounded in contemporary planning practice. 
3.1. Document analysis for identifying scenario themes 
In the first round, we identified the thematic content of the scenarios (in other scenario construction methods often called scenario 
drivers), i.e., key infrastructure developments, by systematically sampling (Bowen, 2009; Matthies & Coners, 2017) strategic foresight 
documents (cf. Kuusi et al., 2015) of five major infrastructure administrators in the Netherlands: Rijkswaterstaat, ProRail, Port of 
Rotterdam, Schiphol, Alliander3 . We requested documents that, according to the administrators, had an actual influence on 
decision-making processes and classify as official data and records (cf. O’Leary, 2004, p. 219). Examples included strategic visions, 
roadmaps, and strategic asset management plans. We coded for critical forces of futures studies, comprising trends, driving forces, 
events, weak signals, discontinuities, and wild cards (Boeije, 2010; Saritas & Smith, 2011). This yielded the twelve most prevalent 
developments, which for the purpose of consistency of the methodological jargon are now called themes: infrastructure length, 
infrastructure cost, mobility, safety, reliability, cybersecurity and digitalization and innovation, economy, national and international 
freight and infrastructure interdependency, energy, environmental pollution, and governance. We operationalized and quantified 
these codes as natural variables, unless that was impossible or data were unavailable (cf. Varho and Tapio, 2013) to serve as input for 
the DPD. 
3.2. Disaggregative Policy Delphi for constructing scenarios 
In the second round, we collected data for the scenarios’ thematic content through a Disaggregative Policy Delphi (DPD) (Tapio, 
2003; Varho & Tapio, 2013). A DPD integrates quantitative (through questionnaires) and qualitative (through interviews) perspectives 
of an expert panel about probable and preferable futures, which are translated into multiple, alternative scenarios through a futures 
table (Rikkonen & Tapio, 2009). 
3.2.1. Establishing the panel 
Since only very generic expert selection criteria can be found in literature (Baker et al., 2006; Collins & Evans, 2002; Goodman, 
1987; Williams & Webb, 1994), we selected experts employing an expertise matrix to ensure sufficient coverage and variety of 
expertise, excluding laypersons (see Appendix A) (Hussler et al., 2011; Kuusi, 1999; Skinner et al., 2015; Varho & Tapio, 2013). In line 
with literature on expert selection (Clayton, 1997; Møldrup & Morgall, 2001; Mullen, 2003; Skulmoski et al., 2007; Tersine & Riggs, 
1976; Varho, 2015), our criteria comprised specialist-field specific and technical know-how, and tacit and experiential knowledge. We 
operationalized these in categories of: thematic knowledge, infrastructure knowledgeability, background organizations (both 
employed within and outside of infrastructure administrations (cf. Okoli and Pawlowski, 2004)), level of education, and management 
level. Persons of first contact at the infrastructure administrations assisted in the selection process of experts (cf. Landeta, 2006). 
3.2.2. Questionnaires 
The first survey visually displays quantitative time-series indicators (see Appendix B), and the second survey displays all experts’ 
round-one answers (Appendix C). Following Varho & Tapio (2013), we created the questionnaire in Microsoft Excel to visually aid 
experts by directly plotting their estimates4 in graphs that show trend continuation or alteration. We set the time horizon at 2030 and 
2050, because 2050 is an estimated peak for infrastructure renewal (Walta, 2015) and because 2030 can aid in connecting the present 
to that long time-period. We collected the quantitative data in multiple face-to-face seminars – instead of the common individual 
Delphi approach – because high attrition resulted from experts having to provide estimates about infrastructures and themes outside of 
their primary expertise. Each seminar started with a short presentation by the researcher outlining the structure of the study, the need 
3 We selected these infrastructure networks because they (1) face significant aging-related investment needs (Ruitenburg & Braaksma, 2017), (2) 
have at least a national orientation and “infrastructure has always been and still is planned, debated, evaluated, decided, and financed mainly at 
national level” (Short & Kopp, 2005, p. 363), which is especially the case for these infrastructure networks, and (3) each individual network is a part 
of a network-of-networks (e.g. D’Agostino & Scala, 2014; Hall et al., 2013; Herder et al., 2008). Knowledge on long-term developments and 
consequences for infrastructure administrations in network-of-networks may be extended by other studies by varying infrastructure network se-
lection regarding these criteria.  
4 Quantitative exactness should not be confused with objective facts, because there are no statistics on the future (Durance and Godet, 2010) and 
(2) the quantitative estimates of future states are inter-subjectively determined by the experts (Tapio et al., 2011). Nor should it be confused with 
statistical representativeness, since Delphi studies do not represent a random sample selection, but a purposively selected sample based on specific 
expertise (ibid.). 
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to develop network-of-networks scenarios, and an explanation of the advantages of quantitative data despite experts’ difficulties of 
making quasi-exact estimates. Subsequently, experts were asked to complete the Excel-based questionnaire in the shared room using 
their own computer. Informative questions were allowed; content-laden discussions were not. Each seminar included 4–8 experts and 
lasted approximately 90 min. We repeated the seminar approach in the fourth round (see Table 1), where we also provided participants 
with a summary report of the interview data to inform their second-survey mutations. 
3.2.3. Interviews 
In the third round, we conducted 34 semi-structured face-to-face interviews. These lasted between one and two hours, were tape- 
recorded, and transcribed. In the interviews, we asked: how interviewees interpreted each indicator per infrastructure; how each 
indicator was perceived to relate to other indicators and infrastructures; how interviewees related probable and preferable future 
estimates to each other; whether interviewees were coherent in their future estimates throughout various themes (see Section 3.1); and 
whether interviewees had an overarching narrative for plausible futures. We prepared the interviews by checking whether the re-
spondents’ future estimates seemed unlikely to co-exist (e.g., large mobility and reliability increase, but limited innovation and cost 
increase). 
3.2.4. Cluster analysis 
Using the second-survey data, we analyzed the quantitative future estimates by using multivariate cluster analysis on each variable 
theme.5 Clustered elements were future estimates. Since each respondent provided both a probable and preferable future estimate, the 
total amount of future estimates is equal to the number of respondents multiplied by two. All variables were standardized linearly on a 
scale of 0–1. No weighing of variables was applied. We selected standardized Euclidean distance as dissimilarity measure, and 
agglomerative hierarchical clustering furthest neighbor (complete linkage) as clustering algorithm. We calculated the arithmetic 
means of the resulting clusters as cluster center. We limited the number of clusters to minimally four or maximally seven (Varho & 
Tapio, 2013). Final cluster selection was based on the mutual combination of quantitative and qualitative data (Tapio et al., 2011): we 
compared whether arithmetic means of all thematic variables between cluster options varied sufficiently for the available qualitative 
data to explain that variation, and used the hierarchical trees (dendrograms) to visually check for the structure of the responses – i.e., 
sub-clusters and outliers – and formed our cluster judgement. 
3.2.5. Qualitative directed content analysis 
The 34 interviews resulted in over 700 pages of transcripts. We grouped the qualitative arguments per theme and employed 
qualitative directed content analysis to target specifically determined categories of experts’ transcripts (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) as 
informed by the cluster analysis (cf. Varho & Tapio, 2013). 
Table 2 
4R framework for adapting (transport) infrastructure (adapted from Givoni & Perl, 2017).  
Option Definition Sectoral 
Orientation 
Renew Refurbishment of existing infrastructure to continue its current transport function. Often includes an upgrade that expands 
capacity. 
Sectoral 
Redesign Converting infrastructure capacity to support different transport modes in the future from what it was originally built for (can 
be “and/or”). 
Inter-sectoral 
Repurpose Allocating infrastructure and its surrounding space to a purpose other than transport function(s). Inter-sectoral 
Remove Completely extract the infrastructure from the space it had occupied. Sectoral  
Round Method Data Analysis # Collected Time Period 
1 Document analysis (3.1.) Coded strategic foresight documents for critical forces to 
determine scenario content 
33 documents June 2018 – 
September 
2018 
2 Disaggregative Policy Delphi 
Survey 1: seminars (3.2.1;3.2.2) 
Employ Expertise matrix to maximize participant variety 
and expertise coverage 
36 surveys December 
2018 – 
April 2019 
3 Disaggregative Policy Delphi 
Interviews: 1− 1 (3.2.3; 3.2.5) 
Execute Qualitative Direct Content Analysis to understand 
scenario story logic 
34 interviews April 2019 – 
May 2019 
4 Disaggregative Policy Delphi 
Survey 2: seminars (3.2.2; 3.2.4) 
Run Multivariate Cluster Analysis of 45 variables in 11 
themes; 1 expert = 2 future estimates; Futures Table to 
construct scenarios 
28 surveys, minimum 4 per 
infrastructure administration 
May 2019 – 
June 2019 
5 Futures-oriented Workshop 
(3.2.6; 3.3) 
Assess probability, desirability, and sectoral orientation, to 
analyze scenario use 
29 attendees, incl. six plus-one 
invitees 
October 2019  
5 Multivariate cluster analysis groups similar units of analysis together ensuring “that the scenario set is based on the views of the expert panel 
instead that of the researcher’s own prejudices” (Tapio & Heinonen, 2018, p. 118). 
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Table 3 












Length         
Roads km 7000 6400 5291 5720 5685 6750 5000 
Rail km 5000 3212 3172 3274 4017 3600 4700 
Ship km 5000 4395 4337 4382 4373 4700 4370 
Cost         
Road Construction € mln 3000 1143 267 1000 1017 2500 644 
Road Renewal € mln 1400 886 1067 713 1042 700 1275 
Rail Renewal € mln 1700 1468 867 928 1279 1000 2125 
Ship Renewal € mln 220 297 290 250 417 500 294 
Mobility         
Road bln vehicle km 169 159 138 134 150 175 90 
Rail bln travelers km 26.78 23.52 19.33 23.75 31.20 40.00 40.00 
Ship quantity ships Port of 
Rotterdam 
33,000 31,619 25,167 24,625 26,200 50,000 27,000 
Aviation quantity flights Schiphol 
airport 
644,444 531,905 531,667 412,500 390,000 400,000 250,000 
Safety         
Road severe accidents 15,400 13,100 1118 7186 12,250 7186 7186 
Rail significant accidents 40 12 2 18 21 18 18 
Ship severe accidents 170 82 9 126 157 126 126 
Reliability         
Road mln vehicle lost hours 132.0 100.0 42.8 42.8 68.9 38.3 61.6 
Rail travelers’ punctuality 80.0 93.0 95.7 95.7 93.0 97.5 91.9 
Ship Norm Time Passage Sluices 90 85 88 88 80 67 75 
Aviation On Time Performance 50.0 80.0 87.8 87.8 76.3 56.7 71.4 
Electricity Downtime (minutes) 200 200 22 22 67 47 34 
Gas Downtime (seconds) 0 150 29 29 94 3 22 
Innovation         
ICT € bln invested 74.8 74.2 74.2 249.4 74.2 285.1 30.8 
Innov and R&D € bln invested 25.5 23.1 23.1 47.5 23.1 50.0 67.5 
Cybersecurity % organizations > 250 
employees 
25.2 73.8 73.8 61.3 73.8 0.0 50.0 
Economy         
GDP € billions 1563 893 776 1041 893 1375 983 
FDI € billions 94 63 68 85 63 182 150 
Freight         
Roads mln metric ton 915 872 600 748 713 835 585 
Rail mln metric ton 106 49 43 66 52 52 111 
Inland Shipping mln metric ton 426 336 300 406 315 380 383 
International Ship mln metric ton 1154 638 400 679 612 630 650 
Pipelines mln metric ton 185 144 130 139 103 225 152 
Aviation mln metric ton 8 2 0 3 2 2 1 
Terminals quantity 59 53 32 66 54 60 49 
Energy         
Road, fossil Petajoule 376.4 320.0 100.0 206.7 125.0 83.3 0.0 
Road, electric Petajoule 16.5 37.6 63.0 117.5 250.0 425.0 203.0 
Rail, fossil Petajoule 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.0 
Rail, electric Petajoule 7.4 8.8 7.4 6.6 20.0 6.6 7.3 
Ship, fossil Petajoule 540.0 414.0 244.4 410.1 275.0 375.0 0.0 
Aviation, fossil Petajoule 191.8 186.0 94.4 150.0 105.0 108.3 0.0 
Environment         
Land mln kg CO2 2917 4687 2917 2750 2750 408 408 
Sea mln kg CO2 9667 8350 9667 5321 5321 2034 2034 
Air mln kg CO2 17,500 12,477 17,500 7571 7571 3275 3275 
Energy mln kg CO2 56,000 45,227 56,000 21,500 21,500 6208 6208 
Governance         
Administrative 
Pressure 
Likert scale 4.75 4.15 2.80 4.15 4.15 2.50 2.15 
Regulatory Pressure Likert scale 5.00 4.54 3.40 4.54 4.54 3.83 2.15 
Spatial Pressure Likert scale 5.00 3.92 3.10 3.92 3.92 4.83 4.58  
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3.2.6. Futures table 
Subsequently, we constructed the scenarios by means of a futures table, in which the rows express the themes and variables, the 
columns represent the scenarios, and the cells comprise the cluster value of a future state (Varho & Tapio, 2013; Vinnari & Tapio, 
2009). The quantitative values of the futures table result from the cluster analysis. Since we ran cluster analysis per theme, different 
themes can have different numbers of clusters. Initially, when any futures table is created with cluster values, the columns do not yet 
represent a scenario. Therefore, we reorganized the cluster themes and connected one theme to another as based on the qualitative 
directed content analysis so that the columns represent a coherent storyline and to maximize internal scenario consistency (Table 3 is 
the resultant futures table). Finally, we wrote storylines supported by the qualitative data and we named the scenarios accordingly (cf. 
Varho & Tapio, 2013). 
3.3. Futures-oriented workshop for scenario use 
In the fifth round, we organized a futures-oriented workshop, a direct-participatory mode of foresight to bridge scenario con-
struction and scenario use. Appendix D provides an anonymized overview of the participants. We invited the scenario construction 
participations from round 4 as participants of the workshop (cf. Franco et al., 2013; Gattringer et al., 2017). Additionally, we offered 
the construction-participants the possibility to invite a colleague with expertise on infrastructure, long-term thinking, renewal, and 
investments (cf. Shah and Swaminathan, 2008) to further enhance scenario use beyond the scenario construction experts. We 
structured the workshop in four phases to maximize familiarization with and application of the scenarios (Cairns et al., 2013; Franco 
et al., 2013; Lauttamäki, 2016; Nygrén, 2019; Street, 1997; Wilson, 2000). 
In the first phase, we started the workshop with a ten-minute introduction explaining the workshop goals and structure. The second 
phase served to familiarize the participants with the scenarios: we provided the participants with the futures table and qualitative 
storylines shaped as newspaper articles from the year 2050 (Neef et al., 2019a; Neef et al., 2019b; O’Brien, 2004). The main question of 
this phase was “what is the impact of the scenarios on the functioning of your own infrastructure network?” Therefore, the participants 
were grouped per infrastructure administration in five groups with a minimum of four experts. In the third phase, the phase-two groups 
were asked to explore important potential infrastructure changes to their own infrastructure under each scenario and to discuss the 
underlying rationale of those changes. We provided the participants with the 4R framework to spark and structure their thoughts 
(Table 2; see also (Givoni & Perl, 2017)). The phase concluded with the participants individually and anonymously ranking each 
scenario on a 7-Likert for probability and desirability (cf. Tapio et al., 2017). In the final phase, the participants were regrouped to 
groups containing at least one expert of each infrastructure administration. They explored the most probable and desirable scenarios6 
for network-of-networks interactions, possible joint infrastructure adjustments, and investment opportunities. Using the 4R framework 
has the advantage that the 4R infrastructural adaptation options have a (pre)disposition to either sectoral or inter-sectoral orientation 
adaptations. These dispositions aid scrutinizing under what scenarios the infrastructure administrators primarily think and act indi-
vidually or with the network-of-networks in mind. 
The data were collected through flip-over sheets that were structured identically for each group, and by questionnaires that were 
handed out directly after the workshop. Facilitators assisted in data collection and group discussion moderation. They were researchers 
involved in the research project, including the authors, thus closely involved with the subject matter (Lauttamäki, 2016). They were 
timekeeper, data recorder, and moderator (Lauttamäki, 2014). As moderator, their role was to minimize their own influence and to 
maximize participants’ idea sharing and development (Lauttamäki, 2016). 
4. Results 
4.1. Seven scenarios 
The columns in the futures table (Table 3) depict the scenarios quantitatively. The values are the result of the cluster analyses 
(section 3.2.4.). For example, the values for theme safety for road, rail, and ship, in both the technological and hyperloop scenarios, are 
respectively 7186, 18, and 126 accidents. The columns represent scenarios because the theme clusters are connected by the qualitative 
directed content analysis (section 3.2.5). For example, the safety theme values of the technological scenario correspond with different 
mobility values than the safety theme values of the hyperloop. Next, we describe the seven scenarios qualitatively by emphasizing their 
main themes and how they cohere. Table 3 
4.1.1. The Infraconomy Revolution 
The first scenario is called The Infraconomy Revolution. It envisions a thriving economy, a strong growth in mobility and freight, and 
major expansion of the infrastructures. It consists for 5.2 % of all probable and 4.2 % of all preferable estimates.7 According to the 
qualitative data, infrastructure facilitates knowledge-intensive and product-based economic developments. Experts envisioned in-
dustry innovators meeting face-to-face and thus high mobility levels. Economic interests are paramount in shaping infrastructural 
demands. A respondent (ID11) illustrates this: “Shrimp are caught in the Netherlands, shipped to Morocco for peeling, and returned to the 
Netherlands on the same day simply because it is cheaper.” They envisioned this ‘the market knows best’ paradigm to co-exist with major 
6 Due to time constraints (cf. Lauttamäki, 2014).  
7 The total of the scenario estimates exceeds 100% because theme cluster analysis intrinsically results in double counting. 
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infrastructure expansion to facilitate such economic interests. Their arguments indicate that transport-related energy demands may 
therefore rise, requiring fossil energy increase resulting in environmental pollution. Respondent (ID25) highlights the crucial role of 
market parties herein: “The industry determines innovation: if Boeing says we go green, then the rest will too.” 
4.1.2. The Techno-Pessimism Revolution 
The second scenario is characterized by skepticism whether innovation truly alters mobility use and is thus called the Techno- 
Pessimism Revolution. The scenario is based on 16.4 % of all probable and 8.8 % of preferable estimates. Qualitative data specific to this 
scenario underscore that, although technology has changed society over the last centuries, it has been incapable of reducing mobility – 
“In the past, technology has created more rather than less traffic: why would that change now?” (Respondent ID32). Moreover, despite many 
efforts to change habitual mobility behavior, people simply prefer to travel alone rather than carpooling. As a respondent (ID33) 
stated: “The self-driving car won’t solve congestion if everybody uses the car individually (…). If driving becomes more convenient, people might 
cover larger distances.” Additionally, the modal split car-to-train has been firmly constant over the past decades: why would this change 
now? Experts stress that skepticism also applies to fake news, which for example relates to the effectiveness of new road infrastructure 
or mobility pricing policies for solving congestion, or to the necessity of climate mitigation measures. Therefore, experts indicate that 
extensive infrastructure expansion to increase reliability and low environmental scores are likely. 
4.1.3. The Safety Revolution 
Wellbeing is the central theme in the Safety Revolution. This scenario consists of 8.3 % of all probable and 10.4 % of all preferable 
estimates. Here, experts emphasize that spending quality time with friends, family or oneself is paramount: “The Dutch live in large 
luxury already. It is not a given that people want to work 4–5 days in the week anymore: we don’t want to see our colleagues more often than our 
children” (Respondent ID10). Experts provided examples of working less hours and being less in traffic. Their motivation for these 
developments comprises lower societal acceptance of transport externalities, such as environmental pollution and foremost safety: 
“Society simply stops accepting that so many severe traffic injures occur with something as mundane as transport: the more welfare and 
wellbeing one attains, the more weight is put on safety” (Respondent ID2). Experts envision automatic driving in rural areas and Mobility 
as a Service (MaaS) concepts in urban areas to stimulate citizens to live rurally and enhance livability in crowded urban areas. Experts 
indicate that, because value of time is high in train-based transport, allocated road infrastructure budgets will shift to developing the 
rail network. The resulting reduced car movements and innovation may increase reliability. However, since economic development is 
reduced, achieving environmental goals may not quite be feasible because of a shortage of energy transition budgets. 
4.1.4. The Technological Revolution 
The fourth scenario is called the Technological Revolution because this scenario includes the highest innovation and ICT budgets. It 
contains 11.9 % of all probable and 11.2 % of all preferable estimates. Technological innovations are envisioned in all infrastructures, 
for example intelligent asset management, predictive maintenance, automatic train operation, smart shipping, hydrogen fuel, and 3D 
printing. The qualitative data emphasize that technological innovation will only be successful if it is accompanied by cooperation, i.e., 
collaborative governance or social innovation: “We must break the ‘passing the buck’ culture. Innovation is more than ICT, it is especially 
cooperation between parties” (Respondent ID20). For example, cross-sector intelligent asset management may provide data to limit 
costs, but this must also be enacted upon: cross-sector collaboration resulting in lower total costs may not occur if higher within-sector 
costs are not adjusted for. Finally, experts suggest that infrastructural network reliability may increase due to flexible working hours of 
knowledge workers, which may enhance peak shaving especially when aforementioned innovations work: a reliability shift can only 
occur through combining self-driving, peak-shaving, employer-oriented and employee-oriented approaches, working at home, and 
more efficient system use, for example MaaS to align supply and demand between users (Respondent ID34). 
4.1.5. The Missed Boat Revolution 
The fifth scenario is characterized by attemptsto make society more sustainable. Yet, climate goals are just not met due to multiple 
environmental, societal, and governance-related challenges. We thus named this scenario the Missed Boat Revolution. It represents 13.3 
% of all probable and 9.1 % of all preferable estimates. Experts indicated that periods of political turbulence (e.g., mouvement des gilets 
jaunes; growth of climate-sceptic political parties) occur and delay environmental advancements. For example: “Simultaneously an anti- 
movement exists, like the yellow vests and Forum for Democracy, which may lead to an entirely different government (…); Yellow-vest 
movements may disrupt achieving environmental targets through resisting oil prices, parking budgets, and driving price policy” (Respondent 
ID8); “Climate is a strongly politicized matter. Political parties such as CDA and VVD, who until recently were climate sceptics, are now 
implementing pro-climate policies. But now there is a party that completely wipes its butt with those policies. There is disinformation from Russia, 
American thinktanks” (Respondent ID11). Additionally, they indicate that, although environmental-innovation advancements such as 
biofuels and electric driving are funded broadly, their adoption is lacking. This is seen in various infrastructure networks. For example, 
for the waterway network, inland shipping on environment-friendly fuels, which could make a large environmental contribution 
through transporting massive amounts of goods on biofuel, may be inhibited by droughts. Related to aviation, societal habituation of 
wealth concords with luxury and loss aversion: international vacation trips and luxury goods are highly valued but environmentally 
polluting, yet society may not accept radical curtailments. Finally, for highway infrastructure, MaaS may be slowly adopted because 
car use remains high as people do not want to carpool. This necessitates more cars, making fossil-car fleet replacement a time- 
consuming development. Experts indicate that such challenges, despite vast investments in rail (both transport of freight and per-
sons), probably result in an over consumption of fossil fuels causing pollution levels just above Parisian Accord levels. 
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4.1.6. The Hyperloop Revolution 
Multiple experts stated that especially a hyperloop could revolutionize transport of goods and people, as well as significantly push 
back energy demand and therefore environmental pollution. Information policy (cf. Kuusi et al., 2015) caused that the Hyperloop 
Revolution was envisioned quantitatively in for example high length values for road and shipping, because respondents felt that a 
hyperloop did not fit in any given category. This scenario contains 4.4 % of all probable and 6.0 % of all preferable estimates. This 
scenario can be considered a special case of the Technological Revolution. A hyperloop is a transport system that moves people and 
cargo through low-pressure or vacuum tubes in wheel-less pods, which may achieve a top speed of approximately 1000 km/h. 
Hyperloops promise to be very energy efficient due to extremely low aerodynamic drag and partially powered track parts, and to be 
very safe because no interaction exists with transport or wildlife, and reliable because no human-driver related error happens. 
However, high uncertainty exists about customer affordability.8 If realized, the hyperloop therefore reduces traffic incidents, 
long-distance mobility and freight, energy use and therefore benefits the environment: “Environmental interests may necessitate new types 
of infrastructures such as the hyperloop. Traffic on short and middle distance is flexible and fast, yet polluting. Shipping is good for long distance, 
yet polluting as well. For exchange between Asia and Europe, pipelines or hyperloops are required” (Respondent ID4). Although infrastructure 
costs of contemporary infrastructures may not rise, total societal costs increase since experts envision that the development of the 
hyperloop will need to be at least partly publicly financed: “Is the mostly private ownership of pipelines desirable for the speed of the energy 
transition? (…). The Port of Rotterdam may co-invest or think along for pipeline freight from a business perspective, but the Port is no grid 
operator. This reactive approach delays the subsurface energy transition development” (Respondent ID15). 
4.1.7. The Green Revolution 
In this final scenario, experts envision a world as environmentally friendly as possible, where fossil fuel use and CO2 levels are 
maximally reduced. We therefore called this scenario the Green Revolution, consisting of 5.2 % of all probable and 9.6 % of all pref-
erable estimates. Experts envision a specific mix of policy instruments and societal acceptance. For example, innovations reducing 
fossil fuels, such as MaaS, hydrogen and full electric driving, may be complemented with policy measures such as pricing policy for 
freight in rush hours and incentives to stimulate first movers to invest in subsurface hydrogen infrastructure. Combined with societal 
acceptance, this may result in a second-hand green-car-only market: “Regardless of political fusses, people will get used to using fossil fuels 
only as last resort” (Respondent ID31). Moreover, experts emphasize that achieving less pollution may occur when governance ad-
dresses the invisible characteristics of pollution: since both international and inland shipping are more polluting than landside mobility 
(e.g. fuel oils and dredgers), innovations in the landside mobility sector may be applied to the shipping sector (e.g. smart shipping, 
cleaner fuels, and fleet replacement). Contrasting, experts also envision spatial solutions that concern invisibility: cities as circular 
warehouses, 3D-printing, and logistic hubs at edges of cities that limit and hide freight. International governance addresses invisibility 
further: especially aviation, shipping, and rail freight are of concern, where governance stimulates plane-to-train substitution above 
the 500 km range and international rail freight networks are standardized. Finally, the qualitative data emphasizes a societal and 
governmental mind shift: vliegschaamte (aviation shame) and treintrots (train pride) feelings can invigorate policies limiting polluting 
modes of transport and stimulate the use of green alternatives: “Climate-perverted developments such as a shopping-weekend in Barcelona 
or New York will automatically disappear” (Respondent ID3); “Flying to Australia emits as much CO2 as a household in one year, and 
households are even becoming more economical” (Respondent ID11). 
4.2. Enhancing scenario use: the workshop 
Since the goal of the workshop was to connect the phases of scenario construction and scenario use, workshop data are of interest 
when it informs about infrastructure administrators’ mental mode resonation with the scenarios, and how the administrators expe-
rienced scenario usefulness. Moreover, data highlighting similarities and differences between different administrations and their 
strategic decision-making within each scenario may indicate particular scenario usefulness for the network-of-networks level. 
The second phase of the workshop (see Section 3.3) demonstrated reoccurring considerations in specific scenarios across the groups 
(Appendix E). Reoccurrence may indicate associations that best reflect the mental modes of decision-makers that were struck. Phase 
three demonstrated that participants felt largely positive about the scenarios’ contributions to explore various sectoral infrastructure 
adaptations and underlying strategies. Positive attitudes towards adaptations and strategies may indicate scenario usefulness in this 
phase. 
Next, infrastructural adaptations – see Table 2 for the description of the four types: renew, redesign, repurpose, and remove – were 
found for each scenario (for a more detailed description, see Appendix F). Comparing the infrastructural adaptations in each scenario, 
what stands out in the Technological Revolution is that the required infrastructural adaptations depend on specific technologies (see 
Section 4.1.4) that, in turn, structure future infrastructural requirements. Consequently, recommended adaptations are diminishing 
the removal and maximizing the conservation of existing infrastructure. In the Green Revolution, administrators experience more 
certainty about infrastructural requirements; inter-sectoral adaptations such as infrastructure redesign and repurpose prevail over 
sectoral adaptations. In the Infraconomy Revolution, administrators also experienced more certainty about infrastructural requirements, 
yet dominant adaptations comprise construction of new infrastructure and renewing aged infrastructure. In the Safety Revolution, 
primarily redesign adaptations are employed to adapt to changing societal demands. In the Techno-Pessimism Revolution, no clear 
8 (https://hyperloop-one.com/facts-frequently-asked-questions). 
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adaptation focus emerges, resulting in renewal of already existing infrastructures. In the Missed Boat Revolution, no clear adaptation 
focus emerges because infrastructural adaptations result from compromises between green or social-conservative strategies. 
Comparing these types of adaptations (Table 2), ranked according to desirability and probability, it stands out that of the three least 
desired scenarios – Infraconomy, Techno-Pessimism, and Missed Boat (Fig. 1) – the latter two were considered the most likely (Fig. 2). 
Fig. 1. Scenario desirability ranking.  
Fig. 2. Scenario probability ranking.  
Table 4 
Different sectoral orientations of probable vs. desirable scenarios.  
Scenario Dominant Sectoral Orientation Dominantly ranked in workshop as 
Infraconomy Sectoral Probable 
Techno-Pessimism Sectoral Probable 
Safety Inter-sectoral Desirable 
Technology Inter-sectoral Desirable 
Missed Boat Sectoral Probable 
Green Inter-sectoral Desirable  
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These three scenarios have in common that they, in contrast to the others, emphasize sectoral renewal adaptations as dominant. 
Conversely, the three more desired scenarios pursue inter-sectoral redesign and repurpose adaptations (Table 4). Potentially, these 
findings indicate that desirable yet unlikely futures are characterized by inter-sectoral infrastructural adaptations, and probable yet 
less desired futures are characterized by sectoral adaptations. 
The fourth phase of the workshop demonstrated that participants were more positive about the scenarios’ contribution to scenario 
use for the network-of-networks than for sectoral networks. Furthermore, participants are generally positive about the workshops’ 
contribution in terms of informing strategy (Appendix G). Together, scenario use seems especially informative for insight in network- 
of-networks, and less so for concrete investment opportunities or sectoral applicability because participants are more aware of their 
sectoral than network-of-network status quo. 
Scenario use in the fourth phase comprises formulating infrastructure adaptations, exploring interdependencies, and examining 
administrator role changes. However, significant unequivocalness exists regarding the exploration of concrete investment opportu-
nities (Appendix G, Fig. G2). Few adaptations were found in the Missed Boat scenario. Participants stated that both interdependency 
adaptations and network-of-networks investment opportunities were sparsely found because this characterizes that scenario. How-
ever, interdependent adaptations were also challenging to formulate for the Green scenario. Examples of these adaptations could be 
Schiphol providing international train travel thus also tending to ProRail, or Rijkswaterstaat providing electric vehicle charging or 
electricity generation on their area, thus investing in energy infrastructure. Moreover, specific role changes for the infrastructure 
administrators were suggested in the Green scenario: since ProRail has been shifting from a mostly technical-mechanical to a mostly 
software-driven organization, ProRail could serve as software coordinator of the network-of-networks; Alliander could function as 
broker, shifting from an energy infrastructure provider to a manager of decentral flows; the Port of Rotterdam could make a market- 
role shift from merely supporting the market towards initiating or being the market regarding, for example, H2-infrastructure. Finally, 
Rijkswaterstaat could prioritize tunneled infrastructures to better capture emissions, increase living quality, and make other admin-
istrators’ subsurface infrastructures better accessible. 
What these depicted adaptations have in common is that, firstly, interdependencies are challenging to find and to translate into 
joint investment opportunities. Secondly, interdependent adaptations are characterized by an organization-outward orientation. 
Thirdly, the adaptations shift from a sectoral character in the Missed Boat to an inter-sectoral character in the Green scenario. The 
implication of these findings may be that, to realize these changes and adaptations, administrators require a more proactive role, i.e., a 
shift from renew and remove to repurpose and redesign. 
At the end of the workshop, every group independently concluded that the collective exploration or utilization of network in-
terdependencies (e.g. aligning time windows of construction) is hampered by insufficient vision, direction, or coordination on the 
network-of-networks level. Participants stated that sub-utilization and sub-exploration (e.g. not considering potential positive ex-
ternalities for other administrations) may be explained by a prevailing conception that sufficient remaining capacity can be exploited 
within their own network. Simultaneously, they acknowledged the need to accept sub-optimal performance of their own network if 
that enables the network-of-networks to perform better, because they expect that overall their own network will perform better on the 
long-term when other administrators also sometimes accept sub-performance. Moreover, they also expressed that interdependency 
underutilization is more resource intensive (e.g. space, materials) and thus less sustainable in environmental and societal terms. 
Consequently, they expressed a need for a common network-of-networks vision to prevent less desirable scenarios from becoming 
more probable. 
5. Discussion 
5.1. Scrutinizing network-of-networks scenarios 
The network-of-networks scenarios intended to further explore how growing interconnectedness between infrastructure networks 
may be exploited in light of aging infrastructures and rising quality and quantity demands of infrastructure services. In other words, 
what network-of-networks interdependencies may inform the strategic planning of multiple infrastructure networks? Where specific 
sectoral infrastructural adaptations were found, transforming those to interdependent infrastructural adaptations is difficult, despite 
employing participatory foresight methods. In order to further that transformation, administrators can invest in scenario use by 
including all sectoral adaptations in a cross-table to investigate whether different administrator’s adaptations are compatible. For 
example, is extension of electricity stations possible along with creating amenities along highways (cf. Platform Green Infrastructures, 
2020)? Is truck platooning possible within the Port of Rotterdam in such a way that it becomes an innovation that can substitute 
environmental unfriendly practices? Can light-rail development prevent the plane-to-train substitution from overloading the train 
network in a tunneled system where access to electricity cables is convenient? 
Next, our workshop data suggest that the less desirable though more probable scenarios (e.g. Missed Boat) offer the least oppor-
tunities for interdependent infrastructure investments. Those scenarios emphasize sectoral infrastructural adaptations, such as 
renewal, over inter-sectoral adaptations such as redesign and repurpose. Alternatively, more desirable futures (e.g. Green Revolution) 
emphasize redesign and repurpose adaptations. Possibly, such adaptations create more interdependencies and therefore more joint 
investment opportunities. After all, the number of investment-involved infrastructure administrators may increase from one in renewal 
adaptations to multiple in redesigning or repurposing adaptations. 
The workshop results also suggest that redesigning and repurposing adaptations coincide with a more proactive and collaborative 
role of infrastructure administrators; it requires creation of a common vision, language, approach, or (financial) assessment framework for 
the planning of collective, long-term, infrastructure investments. Examples are, jargon, protocol, and a renewal database that is inter- 
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administrationally operated. On the one hand, our study enabled infrastructure administrators to communicate about possible futures 
of both their own infrastructure networks and of other administrators’ networks. On the other hand, progressing from gazing over the 
boundaries of their sectoral networks to a common (institutional) ground that enables them to identify and act on network-of-networks 
investment opportunities proved more challenging. This common ground either does not exist or the common ground constitutes the 
absence of sectoral collaboration and proliferation of acting with an intersectoral orientation (for the planning of collective, long-term, 
infrastructure investments). Put more clearly: a basic language that allows infrastructure administrators to communicate across sectors 
exists, a common ground to act upon does not. The workshop results suggest that this lacking common ground may be explained by 
administrators their prevailing conception that sufficient remaining capacity can be exploited within the individual networks. 
Moreover, the data suggest that administrators think that sector-specific institutional frameworks suffice to further develop their 
networks. Hence, while interdependencies between networks may be scrutinized in earlier phases of the workshop, they do not make 
their way in administrators’ minds to act upon those interdependencies in later phases of the workshop. The lack of attention for the 
interdependencies between networks may especially inhibit identifying network-of-networks investment opportunities when there is 
no incentive or awareness that another administration could benefit from an administration’s infrastructural adaptation. Here, 
developing a common ground requires addressing institutional fragmentation. A proactive and collaborative role of administrators 
should then be a prominent feature in developing and enacting a common ground as a way of thinking and acting in the planning of 
collective, long-term, infrastructure investments. 
5.2. Scrutinizing scenario use 
The futures-oriented workshop intended to connect scenario construction to scenario use. Scenario use occurred both within and 
outside the study. Within the workshop, the positively evaluated effects on familiarizing the scenarios and applying the scenarios to the 
infrastructure networks and network-of-networks serve as evidence. Outside the study, all participants of Rijkswaterstaat wrote an 
official letter to their management about the necessity of developing a network-of-networks vision to prevent sub-optimal futures 
regarding major challenges (e.g., energy transition and renewal) from becoming reality. Together, scenario use may thus amount to 
establishing sense of urgency. 
Whether scenario use could be augmented beyond establishing sense of urgency towards a more concrete exploration of joint 
investment opportunities – by means of the joint formulation of ex-ante interdependencies between the respective infrastructure 
networks – remains to be answered. Because clear interdependencies did not emerge from the construction process, the formulation of 
them by the research team may not resonate with the administrators’ mental modes. Additionally, the performative dimension of a 
single workshop is limited: whether similar processes have been instigated at other infrastructure administrations than Rijkswaterstaat 
is unclear; moreover, whether actual decision-making is affected by the scenarios cannot yet be said. In our study, we consider sce-
narios as ‘a purposeful basis for further inquiry’ and as such the scenarios aid in transparently and systematically scrutinizing network- 
of-networks and creating sense of urgency to further decision-making. Moreover, the workshop itself and networking afterwards 
provided a basis for a social network-of-networks, which was informally mentioned to the researchers as a valuable result in itself. 
Overall, the results suggest that the futures-oriented workshop is well equipped for discussing various future images of involved actors, 
about themselves and about others (Cairns et al., 2013; cf. Street, 1997), as well as collaborative learning (Nygrén, 2019). However, a 
single workshop may limit scenario use regarding strategy formulation (cf. Nowack et al., 2011) in a multi-actor setting. 
Finally, the workshop may enhance the use of network-of-networks scenario through enhancing mutual understanding between 
administrators. During the workshop, the administrators indicated a willingness to accept a sub-optimal operation of their own 
network for the benefit of the network-of-networks, despite the lack of institutional mechanisms to incentivize such inter-sectoral 
thought. Thus, by connecting scenario construction to use, this participatory mode of foresight may have contributed to the idea 
that keeping to individual infrastructure decision-making processes does decrease the perceived complexity of the decision-making (cf. 
Teisman et al., 2009), but doesn’t show interdependent network-of-networks effects. We thus underscore that participatory foresight 
may have a potential to emphasize participants’ interrelations in situations of institutional fragmentation, because it created 
awareness at infrastructure administrators that their foresight processes should be more intertwined (cf. Van der Duin & Ligtvoet, 
2019a). 
5.3. Methodological considerations 
Whereas in the first Delphi survey many experts stated that providing future estimates was challenging9 because they had to give 
estimates about infrastructures and developments outside of their primary expertise, the second round demonstrated few adaptations 
indicating limited transdisciplinary learning. Multiple respondents explained, at the end of the second seminar, that they had thought 
thoroughly about their estimates in the first survey, and therefore would not adapt their answer as long as they were no extreme 
outlier. Possibly, respondents were affected by a commitment mechanism (Cialdini, 2013). Moreover, some experts indicated that the 
summary report portrayed arguments for both raising and lowering their estimates thence reducing their inclination to adapt their 
9 Experts experienced difficulty providing a specific number for estimates, arguing that they do not know that number precisely leading to feelings 
of ‘guessing’. However, quantitative estimates differ from objective quantitative exactness and objective facts: there are no statistics on the future 
(Durance and Godet, 2010) and the quantitative estimates are inter-subjectively determined by the entire expert panel (Tapio et al., 2011). 
Especially experts with a quantitative background, i.e. civil engineers and asset managers, found this concept hard to grasp. 
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estimates. However, the results demonstrated that workshop participants were clearly satisfied with learning about other networks. 
Consequently, the combination of the Delphi and a futures-oriented workshop seems to contribute to transdisciplinary learning. 
Whilst our methodological approach has the advantage of being representative of the demographics of infrastructure adminis-
trators and reveals that current infrastructure administrators likely portray a certain intersectoral blindness, simultaneously our 
approach may imply a certain institutional bias, speaking to the prevailing administrators-in-power. Indeed, the document analysis 
involved documents that the current experts of infrastructure planning indicated as influential, and the Delphi consisted of experts 
who, while representative of contemporary infrastructure planning, mostly represent a rather narrow demographic. An approach 
counteracting our sampling strategy – for example primarily seeking critical forces outside of infrastructure planning and selecting 
experts not based on technical know-how, and tacit and experiential knowledge, as well as explicitly targeting a different demographic 
(e.g., under 35 and female) – might have led to different scenarios, a different interpretation of probability and desirability, a different 
understanding of collaboration, and more common ground for long-term strategizing in network-of-networks. For example, would 
such scenario construction and use be better able to identify more possibilities for (institutional) collaboration and co-investment 
across infrastructure silos, and would the more desirable scenarios be assumed more probable? The resulting scenarios might have 
been more out-of-the-box and transformative, though this would have been at the expense of representativeness of contemporary 
infrastructure planning and potentially resonating less with the mental modes of infrastructure administrators. Such an alternative 
approach is complementary to this study and is an interesting avenue for future research. 
Finally, preferable future estimates may indicate a relative degree of importance. For instance, the value “zero” frequently occurred 
for safety desirability, i.e. the amount of serious injuries on various infrastructures. Experts explained that anyone would enter the 
preferable value “zero” for such an indicator. However, following that same rational, a zero-value answer should also apply to fossil 
fuel use (energy use), environmental pollution (CO2 emissions), cybersecurity (ICT incidents), and reliability (no transport or dis-
tribution jams). This was far less often the case (Appendix H). Arguments for scoring a non-zero value on safety mostly relate to 
feasibility; for example, the costs would be too high to achieve full safety. Since respondents that scored zero on safety offer this 
argument for other themes, zero values may capture the relative importance of variables as traded off against feasibility, indicating a 
relative value hierarchy. Alternatively, any zero-value option may be considered a limitation of the method, because it provides insight 
in value prioritization rather than a realistic estimate of plausible future values. 
6. Conclusion 
Infrastructure planners are confronted with considerable investment needs because of aging infrastructures and societal and 
climate challenges such as the energy transition. Tackling those challenges with an explicit long-term focus is vital because of the major 
sunk costs, long infrastructure lifetimes and consequent path dependencies, lock-ins, and inertia involved (De Bruijne, 2006; Geels, 
2004; Wegener & Fürst, 1999). Also, an explicit collective focus is needed due to increasing interdependencies between infrastructures 
in a network-of-networks. Both are challenging due to institutional fragmentation in general and fragmentation of foresight processes 
in particular. To enhance anticipation of aforementioned challenges, we constructed seven scenarios with an explicit focus on prac-
titioner participation to help bridging scenario construction and scenario use. This enabled the scenarios to become performative 
across fragmented institutional boundaries of the studied infrastructure administrations. 
Our study produced, through a hybrid-method approach, seven explorative scenarios: the Infraconomy Revolution, the Safety 
Revolution, Techno-Pessimism Revolution, the Technological Revolution, The Green Revolution, The Missed Boat, and the Hyperloop 
Revolution. The analysis of the scenarios generated three main conclusions. First, interdependencies do not simply emerge from 
scenario processes with multiple infrastructure administrators, i.e. network-of-networks actors, arguably because each scenarios’ 
depicted infrastructural adaptations have a strong sectoral character. Potentially, this is due to a prevailing conception of infra-
structure administrators that sufficient optimization capacity remains within the own infrastructure network. Second, there is a need to 
collaborate: the less desirable scenarios appear more probable when a sectoral optimization (i.e. non-collaborative) perspective is 
maintained (e.g. like-for-like renewal), whereas the more desirable scenarios appear to build on inter-sectoral infrastructural adap-
tations (e.g. redesign and repurpose adaptations). Third, to draft and implement inter-sectoral adaptations, infrastructure adminis-
trators need to employ a proactive role in seeking such adaptations. To conduct an infrastructural adaptation with a sectoral 
orientation may seem logical from one administrators’ perspective, but it may miss out on joint investment opportunities from another 
administrators’ perspective. Infrastructure administrators require a common ground, for instance in the form of a common database or 
vision, to identify these opportunities. The lack of such a ground, in terms of being non-existent or constituting one without inter- 
sectoral collaboration, is reflective of institutional fragmentation. One of the barriers of putting more effort in creating a common 
ground may be aforementioned optimization conception. 
Finally, this study also provides insight in methodological developments of participatory foresight. A major benefit of participatory 
foresight is its incentivizing power to connect scenario construction to use, and especially to do so in an institutionally fragmented 
situation such as infrastructure network-of-networks. However, bridging scenario construction and scenario use does not equate 
complete strategy development. Scenario use in this study yielded establishing a sense of urgency, i.e., growth of interest in collab-
oration in the foresight phase: “For cases that require radical change of behavior and/or substantial investments of multiple actors, it is 
imperative that a joint visioning, planning and execution program is established” (Gattringer et al. 2017, cited from Rohrbeck et al., 
2015 p.6). We thus add that if those joint initiatives do not arise independently, participatory foresight is an instrument to initiate those 
processes especially in institutionally fragmented situations such as inter-sectoral infrastructure planning. 
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Appendix 
A Expertise matrix 
See Fig. A1. 
The expertise matrix reveals the coverage and variety of the expertise in the panel. The two elements that stand out are the low 
numbers of female participants (3/33) and participants aged under 30 years old (2/33). The percentages in this professional branch are 
representative of the Dutch population for females (9%), but are not for persons aged 25–35 (22 %)(CBS, 2016). The relatively low 
representation of young participants is attributed to the definition of ‘expert’, which may be considered rare within the young age 
group. We thus consider the expertise matrix to reveal sufficient coverage and variety for representational purposes. 
Fig. A1. Delphi survey one: excerpt of a single theme, querying multiple infrastructures visually with graphs displaying a single respondents 
probable and preferable futures estimates. 
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B Delphi survey 1 example 
See Fig. B1. 
The first survey displays the question (top row, numbered 1), elaborates on the indicator (below, text cropped, numbered 2), the 
time-series data of multiple infrastructures quantitatively (visible in grey and yellow, cropped, numbered 3), the time-series data 
visually (graphs with blue and orange background, numbered 4) that plots the future estimates that respondents enter in the green cells 
(numbered 5), where the dotted line (see orange graph) represents probable estimates (numbered 6), and the dashed line represents 
preferable estimates (numbered 7). Qualitative data may be entered in the light blue cells (numbered 8). 
C. Delphi survey 2 example 
See Fig. C1. 
The second survey differs from the first survey in two elements. Firstly, the graphs now display either preferable or probable future 
estimates instead of both. Second, the graph displays the other experts’ estimates in blue-colored lines, and the survey-specific re-
spondent’s estimates in a thick black-dashed line. 
Fig. B1. Delphi survey two: excerpt of a single theme, querying multiple infrastructures visually, with graphs displaying all respondents either 
probable or preferable estimates. 
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D. Futures-oriented Workshop: Survey and Participants 
Table D1 shows the number of respondents per organization that were present at the futures-oriented workshop. 
E Futures-oriented Workshop: Phase 2 
Phase two demonstrated yielded phrases and considerations that reoccurred in specific scenarios across groups (see Table E1), 
possibly explaining the generally positive affect regarding the familiarization with the constructed scenarios as displayed in Fig. E1 . 
Fig. C1. Expertise matrix.  
Table D1 
Futures-oriented workshop.  
Organization Number of Participants Cumulative 
Rijkswaterstaat 5  
ProRail 4 9 
Port of Rotterdam 1 10 
Alliander 2 12 
Schiphol 5 17 
Other 6 23 
Facilitators 6 29  
R. Neef et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Futures 124 (2020) 102649
17
F Futures-oriented Workshop: Phase 3 
Multiple infrastructural adaptations were found for each scenario. 
See Table F1. 
Table E1 
Workshop results: reoccurring phrases and consideration of the familiarization phase.  
Scenario Reoccurring phrases and considerations 
Infraconomy Wearing blinders; your wish is our command; Singapore vs. Shanghai?; barely environmentally aware; spatial scarcity; up-scaling, capacity 
increase 
Safety Will we have more (ProRail & Alliander), or less to do (PoR) or is it unclear (RWS & Schiphol); local and/or decentral 
Techno- 
Pessimism 
Muddling through, little change in current approach or current paved path. Results in the Missed Boat, but not deliberately. 
Green Decentral infrastructure streams, central direction; the intended path; less fossil; strategically and/or long term different 
Technological Difficulty of applying technology and making technology compatible 
Missed Boat Polarization; failing public support; compromising at its best; disinvestments; short-cycle perspective; keeping the pot boiling  
Fig. E1. Workshop results: participants’ affect towards increased familiarity of the constructed scenarios (in purple) and network strategy 
formulation (in blue). 
Table F1 
Workshop results: reoccurring adaptations and considerations that inform sectoral investment strategies.  
Scenario Reoccurring adaptations and considerations 
Infraconomy Emphasis on renew for all administrations. Adaptations all concern assets of the own administration (PoR: storage depots and Goerree 
Overvlakkee; RWS: connection Schiphol-Amsterdam-Almere; Alliander: new electricity stations; Schiphol: new terminal; ProRail: more 
general rail infra). 
Safety Emphasis on redesign for all administrators except ProRail who emphasizes repurpose (moving from a mechanical to software-logistics driven 
organization) (PoR: platooning hub; RWS: new amenities along the road; Alliander: redesign network structure; Schiphol: exclusive access 
through (light) rail). 
Techno- 
Pessimism 
Emphasis on renew for all administrators, stressing muddling through without specifying what that means. 
Green Emphasis on repurpose and redesign for all administrators, because most infrastructure administrators gain an environmental-oriented 
perspective (e.g. PoR Carbon Capturing and ‘restwarmte’ replacing current petrochemical industry; RWS tunnel construction to better 
capture CO2 at tunnels’ edges, and using its area for energy production and distribution; Alliander shifts to a broker role instead of mere 
network administrator to stimulate and balance local community-based production and energy storage; Schiphol shifts towards H2 and 
electric fuel options, with a high business-transposition of plane-to-train; ProRail gain a challenge regarding light-rail transport and 
coordination of multi-level networks. 
Technological Emphasis on no remove for all administrators except Schiphol (parking) because of efficient infrastructural use. Emphasis on redesign and/or 
repurpose depending on technologies (integration of software logistics with environment; required employees at Schiphol airport due to 
robotization; demands for road infrastructure from truck platooning and energy infrastructure from new energy sources) 
Missed Boat Unequivocal mix of renew and redesign. Renew comprises life extension of assets and like-for-like replacement (Schiphol, Alliander) and thus 
no proper attention for the renewal challenge (RWS), where redesign comprises mild adaptations of hubs (Schiphol as new transfer methods 
and as train hub; Alliander obtains a role as energy bank; PoR marginal investments in new business)  
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G Futures-oriented Workshop: Phase 4 
See Figs. G1,. 
H Hierarchy Tree of Relative Variable Importance based on Zero Values 
Preferable future estimates might indicate a relative degree of importance. 
See Table G1. 
Fig. G1. Workshop results: contribution to network-of-network strategy is valued higher than to network strategy.  
Fig. G2. Workshop results: contribution to general strategic information is valued higher than to concrete investment opportunities.  
Table G1 
Delphi data of zero values.  
Variable Indicator Involved # Infra-structures in indicator Zeros applied to # infrastructures Total Amount of Zeros 
Safety Severe incidents 3 3 41 
Energy (fossil fuels) Petajoule 4 4 33 
Environment CO2 emissions 4 (road & rail aggregated) 4 (road & rail aggregated) 16 
Cybersecurity ICT incidents 1 (all infrastructures aggregated) 1 (all infrastructures aggregated) 4 
Costs (Construction) Million euros 3 2 3 
Freight Million tons 5 1 1 
Mobility Billion vehicle kilometers 4 1 1  
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